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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to introduce and axiomatically char-
acterize the P-value as a rule to solve the cost sharing problem in minimum
cost spanning tree (mcst) situations. The P-value is related to the Kruskal
algorithm for ﬁnding an mcst. Moreover, the P-value leads to a core allo-
cation of the corresponding mcst game, and when applied also to the mcst
subsituations it delivers a population monotonic allocation scheme. A cone-
wise positive linearity property is one of the basic ingredients of an axiomatic
characterization of the P-value.
Key-words: Cost sharing, minimum cost spanning tree games, value, po-
pulation monotonic allocation schemes.
1 Introduction
Since the basic paper of Bird (1976) much attention has been paid to the
problem of sharing costs in situations where agents have to be connected
with a source as cheap as possible, and where connections between users and
between users and the source can be shared among users if they cooperate.
Let us refer to the dissertations of Aarts (1994) and Feltkamp (1995), and
to the papers of Granot and Huberman (1981), Feltkamp et al. (1994), and
Kar (2002). In the papers of Dutta and Kar (2002), Kent and Skorin-Kapov
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(1996), Moretti et al. (2002), and Norde et al. (2001), the existence of cost
monotonic and population monotonic allocation rules (Sprumont (1990)) is
central.
The P-value introduced in Section 3, has been arisen from our interest
in monotonic allocation schemes too (Tijs et al. (2003)). Our introduction
of the P-value is a two-step procedure. First, we deﬁne this value on cones
of mcst situations with the same ordering pattern of the edges with respect
to costs. Then, we prove that we can patch these P-values together to the
whole cone of mcst situations. It turns out that our P-value equals the
Equal Remaining Obligations (ERO) rule suggested by Jos Potters (which
explains the name of our rule) and which is studied ﬁrst in Feltkamp et
al. (1994). Furthermore, our P-value turns out to be the average of the
population monotonic allocation rules introduced in Norde et al. (2001). In
Section 4 we give an axiomatic characterization of the P-value, where the
cone-wise positive linearity of P is a fundamental property and where the
decomposition of an mcst situation into simple mcst situations (cf. Kuipers
(1993), Norde et al. (2001)) plays a role. In Section 5, which concludes the
paper, the related Π-value for minimum spanning tree games is introduced
and it is shown that the Π-value is a population monotonic allocation rule.
2 Preliminaries and notations
First, we recall some deﬁnitions from graph theory which are used in this
paper. An (undirected) graph is a pair < V;E >, where V is a set of vertices
or nodes and E is a set of edges e of the form fi;jg with i;j 2 V , i 6= j.
The complete graph on a set V of vertices is the graph < V;EV >, where
EV = ffi;jgji;j 2 V and i 6= jg. A path between i and j in a graph < V;E >
is a sequence of nodes i = i0;i1;:::;ik = j, k ¸ 1, such that fis;is+1g 2 E
for each s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g. A cycle in < V;E > is a path from i to i for
some i 2 V . Two nodes i;j 2 V are connected in (V;E) if i = j or if there
exists a path between i and j in E.
Now, we consider minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations. In an
mcst situation a set N = f1;:::;ng of agents is involved willing to be con-
nected as cheap as possible to a source (i.e. a supplier of a service) denoted
by 0. In the sequel we use the notation N0 = N [f0g. An mcst situation can
be represented by a tuple < N0;EN0;w >, where < N0;EN0 > is the complete
graph on the set N0 of nodes or vertices, and w : EN0 ! I R+ is a map which
assigns to each edge e 2 EN0 a nonnegative number w(e) representing the
weight or cost of edge e. We call w a weight function. If w(e) 2 f0;1g for
every e 2 EN0, the weight function w is called a simple weight function, and3
we refer then to < N0;EN0;w > as a simple mcst situation.
Since in our paper the graph of possible edges is always the complete
graph, we simply denote an mcst situation with set of users N, source 0,
and weight function w by < N0;w >. Often we identify an mcst situation
< N0;w > with the corresponding weight function w. We denote by WN0 the
set of all mcst situations < N0;w > (or w) with node set N0. For each S µ N,
one can consider the mcst subsituation < S0;wjS0 >, where S0 = S [f0g and
wjS0 : ES0 ! I R+ is the restriction of the weight function w to ES0 µ EN0,
i.e. wjS0(e) = w(e) for each e 2 ES0.
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. Two nodes i and j are called (w;N0)-
connected if i = j or if there exists a sequence of nodes i = i0;:::;ik = j in
N0, k ¸ 1, with w(fis;is+1g) = 0 for every s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g. A (w;N0)-
component of N0 is a maximal subset of N0 with the property that any
two nodes in this subset are (w;N0)-connected. We denote by Ci(w) the
(w;N0)-component to which i belongs and by C(w) the set of all the (w;N0)-
components of N0. Clearly, the collection of (w;N0)-components forms a
partition of N0.
We deﬁne the set ΣEN0 of linear orders on EN0 as the set of all bijections
¾ : f1;:::;jEN0jg ! EN0, where jEN0j is the cardinality of the set EN0. For
each mcst situation < N0;w > there exists at least one linear order ¾ 2 ΣEN0





For any ¾ 2 ΣEN0 we deﬁne the set
K
¾ = fw 2 I R
EN0
+ j w(¾(1)) · w(¾(2)) · ::: · w(¾(jEN0j))g:
The set K¾ is a cone in I R
EN0
+ , which we call the Kruskal cone with respect
to ¾. One can easily see that
S
¾2ΣEN0 K¾ = I R
EN0
+ . For each ¾ 2 ΣEN0 the
cone K¾ is a simplicial cone with generators e¾;k 2 K¾, k 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg,
where
e¾;k(¾(1)) = e¾;k(¾(2)) = ::: = e¾;k(¾(k ¡ 1)) = 0
and
e¾;k(¾(k)) = e¾;k(¾(k + 1)) = ::: = e¾;k(¾(jEN0j)) = 1
(1)
[Note that e¾;1(¾(k)) = 1 for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg].
This implies that each w 2 K¾ can be written in a unique way as non-
negative linear combination of these generators. To be more concrete, for










Clearly, we can also write WN0 =
S
¾2ΣEN0 K¾, if we identify an mcst
situation < N0;w > with w.
Any mcst situation gives rise to two problems: the construction of a
network Γ µ EN0 of minimal cost connecting all users to the source, and
a cost sharing problem of distributing this cost among users in a fair way.
The cost of a network Γ is w(Γ) =
P
e2Γ w(e). A network Γ is a spanning
network on S0 µ N0 if for every e 2 Γ we have e 2 ES0 and for every i 2 S
there is a path in Γ from i to the source. The cost of a minimum (cost)
spanning network Γ on N0 in a simple mcst situation equals jC(w)j ¡ 1 (see
Lemma 2 in Norde et al. (2001)). To construct a minimum cost spanning
network Γ on N0 we use in this paper the Kruskal algorithm (Kruskal (1956)),
where the edges are considered one by one according to non-decreasing cost,
and an edge is either rejected, if it generates a cycle with the edges already
constructed, or it is constructed, otherwise.
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. The minimum cost spanning tree
game (N;cw) (or simply cw), corresponding to < N0;w >, is deﬁned by
cw(S) = minfw(Γ)jΓ is a spanning network on S
0g
for every S 2 2Nnf;g, where 2N stands for the power set of the player set
N, with the convention that cw(;) = 0.
We denote by MCST
N the class of all mcst games corresponding to mcst
situations in WN0. For each ¾ 2 ΣEN0, we denote by G¾ the set fcw j w 2 K¾g
which is a cone. We can express MCST




¾2ΣEN0 G¾, and we would like to point out that MCST
N itself
is not a cone if jNj ¸ 2.
3 The P-value
Let w 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾. We can consider
a sequence of precisely jEN0j + 1 graphs < N0;F ¾;0 >;< N0;F ¾;1 >;:::;
< N0;F ¾;jEN0j > such that F ¾;0 = ;, F ¾;k = F ¾;k¡1 [ f¾(k)g for each
k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg. Now, we deﬁne the connection vectors b¾;k 2 I RN for











for each i 2 N, where ni(F ¾;k) is the number of nodes in N which are
connected to i, directly or indirectly, via edges in F ¾;k. Note that ni(F ¾;k) = 15
if i is disconnected from each other node in < N0;F ¾;k >. Note also that for
each ¾ 2 ΣEN0, b
¾;0
i = 1 and b
¾;jEN0j
i = 0, for each i 2 N.
Example 1 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w as depicted in Figure 1. Note that w 2 K¾, with ¾(1) = f1;3g,































Figure 1: An mcst situation with three agents.
The sequence of seven graphs < N0;F ¾;k > and the corresponding con-
nection vectors b¾;k are shown in the following table
< N0;; > b¾;0 = (1;1;1)t
< N0;ff1;3gg > b¾;1 = (1
2;1; 1
2)t








< N0;ff1;3g;f1;2g;f2;3g;f1;0gg > b¾;4 = (0;0;0)t
< N0;ff1;3g;f1;2g;f2;3g;f1;0g;f2;0gg > b¾;5 = (0;0;0)t
< N0;ff1;3g;f1;2g;f2;3g;f1;0g;f2;0g;f3;0gg > b¾;6 = (0;0;0)t
Remark 1 Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0. For each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, consider the simple
mcst situation e¾;k. Then, for k > 1, each edge e 2 F ¾;k¡1 has cost e¾;k(e) = 0.
Therefore, if i and j in N0 are connected in < N0;F ¾;k¡1 >, then they are
also in the same (e¾;k;N0)-component. Conversely, if i and j are in the same
(e¾;k;N0)-component, then they are also connected in < N0;F ¾;k¡1 > and as





Deﬁnition 1 Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0. The contribution matrix w.r.t. ¾ is the matrix
M¾ 2 I RN£EN0 where the rows correspond to the agents and the columns to






for each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg. [Here ek is a column vector such that ek
i = 1 if
i = k and ek
i = 0 for each i 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg n fkg.]6
Note that each column M¾ek such that (M¾ek)i 6= 0 for some i 2 N corre-
sponds to the edge ¾(k) constructed at stage k in Kruskal’s algorithm. Note
that the sum of the elements of such a column equals 1. The interpretation of
the contribution vector M¾ek is that each entry (M¾ek)i, i 2 N, represents
the fraction of the cost of edge ¾(k) paid by user i. On the other hand, the
zero columns in M¾ correspond to rejected edges in Kruskal’s algorithm.
Another characteristic of the contribution matrix is that the sum of the



















i = 1 ¡ 0 = 1: (5)
Deﬁnition 2 For each ¾ 2 ΣEN0, we deﬁne the P ¾-value as the map P ¾ :
K¾ ! I RN, where P ¾(w) = M¾w¾ for each mcst situation w in the cone K¾.
In order to deﬁne P on WN0 we need Proposition 1, which follows directly
from the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0;w 2 K¾ and suppose that, for some t 2 f1;:::;
jEN0j¡1g, w¾
t = w¾
t+1. Then for the ordering ¾0 2 ΣEN0 such that ¾0(i) = ¾(i)
for each i 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg n ft;t + 1g, ¾0(t) = ¾(t + 1) and ¾0(t + 1) = ¾(t),
we have that w 2 K¾0 and P ¾(w) = P ¾0(w).
Proof It is obvious that w 2 K¾0. Put a = w¾
t . Note that b¾;k = b¾0;k for all
k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg with k 6= t. This implies that w¾
k M¾ek = w¾0
k M¾0ek for
all k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg with k = 2 ft;t + 1g and
w¾0
t M¾0et + w¾0
t+1M¾0et+1 =
= a(b¾0;t¡1 ¡ b¾0;t) + a(b¾0;t ¡ b¾0;t+1) =
= a(b¾0;t¡1 ¡ b¾0;t+1) = a(b¾;t¡1 ¡ b¾;t+1) =
= a(b¾;t¡1 ¡ b¾;t) + a(b¾;t ¡ b¾;t+1) =
= w¾
t M¾et + w¾
t+1M¾et+1
(6)
So, M¾w¾ = M¾0w¾0 or, equivalently, P ¾(w) = P ¾0(w).
Proposition 1 If w 2 K¾ \ K¾0 with ¾;¾0 2 ΣEN0, then P ¾(w) = P ¾0(w).
This proposition makes it possible to deﬁne the P-value on WN0.





for each w 2 WN0, and ¾ 2 ΣEN0 such that w 2 K¾.7





















and w¾ = (10;18;20;24;24;26)t. Therefore P(w) = M¾w¾ = (16;20;16)t.
An alternative way of calculating P(w), which will be useful in the following,
is as nonnegative linear combination of P(e¾;k), k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, where
¾ 2 ΣEN0 is such that w 2 K¾ (see equation (2)). In formula,




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
P(e¾;k): (8)
Note that since for each ¾ 2 ΣEN0 the connection vector b¾;jEN0j is the zero
vector, the P-value of each mcst situation e¾;k 2 K¾, k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg,











Remark 2 It turns out that the P-value coincides with the Equal Remain-
ing Obligations (ERO) rule. The ERO-rule has been introduced in Feltkamp
et al. (1994) via an extension of Kruskal’s algorithm. According to the
ERO-rule, at each stage k 2 f0;1;:::;jEN0jg of the algorithm, each player
i 2 N pays exactly the diﬀerence fk








i for each i 2 N, where, as shown in Theorem 4.3 of
Feltkamp et al. (1994), ok
i is equal to b
¾;k
i , with ¾ such that w 2 K¾, as cal-
culated in relation (3). An axiomatic characterization of the ERO-rule using
the properties of NE (Non-Emptiness), FSC (Free-for-Source-Component),
LOC (Local), Eﬀ (Eﬃciency), ET (Equal Treatment) and IPCons (Inversely
Proportional Consistency) is given there.
In the next section we provide an alternative axiomatic characterization.
4 An axiomatic characterization of the
P-value
We call a map F : WN0 ! I RN assigning to every mcst situation w a unique
cost allocation in I RN a solution. Some interesting properties for solutions of
mcst situations are the following.8




where Γ is a minimum cost spanning network on N0.
Property 2 The solution F has the Equal Treatment (ET) property if for
each w 2 WN0 and for each i;j 2 N with Ci(w) = Cj(w)
Fi(w) = Fj(w):
Property 3 The solution F has the Upper Bounded Contribution (UBC)






Property 4 The solution F has the Cone-wise Positive Linearity (CPL)
property if for each ¾ 2 ΣEN0, for each pair of mcst situations w; b w 2 K¾
and for each pair ®; b ® ¸ 0, we have
F(®w + b ®b w) = ®F(w) + b ®F(b w):
Proposition 2 The P-value satisﬁes the properties EFF, ET, UBC and
CPL.
Proof Let w 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Then the
following considerations hold:
i) Let ¾(t1), ¾(t2);:::, ¾(tn), be the n edges of the mcst Γ corresponding
to Kruskal order ¾. These edges correspond to non-zero columns in

























which proves the EFF property.9
ii) Note that if w is the zero function then the ET property is trivially
satisﬁed. Consider w 6= 0 and deﬁne k = minfjjw(¾(j)) > 0g. Then















Let C be a (w;N0)-component and consider two users i;j 2 C. By Re-
mark 1 this means that i and j are connected in the graph < N0;F ¾;k¡1 >











Hence, by (10), Pi(w)=Pj(w), which proves the ET property.
iii) If w is the zero function then the UBC property is trivially satisﬁed.
Consider w 6= 0 and let C 6= f0g be a (w;N0)-component. Note
that there exists m 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg such that ¾(m) µ C [ f0g and
w(¾(m)) = mini2Cnf0g w(fi;0g). Deﬁne k = minfjjw(¾(j)) > 0g. If
m < k, then 0 2 C and we are done since nodes in C nf0g pay nothing




























where in the ﬁrst equality we use that b
¾;u
i = 0 for all u 2 fm;:::;jEN0jg
and for each i 2 C, and in the last one we use the fact that all nodes
in C n f0g are connected in the graph < N0;F ¾;k¡1 >. Note that (11)
proves the UBC property.
iv) The CPL property follows trivially from the deﬁnition of P.
Theorem 1 The P-value is the unique solution which satisﬁes the properties
EFF, ET, UBC and CPL on the class WN0 of mcst situations.
Proof We already know by Proposition 2 that the P-value satisﬁes the four
properties EFF, ET, UBC and CPL. To prove the uniqueness consider a map
Ã : WN0 ! I RN satisfying EFF, ET, UBC and CPL.10
Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 and k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg. First we will show that for each
mcst situation e¾;k 2 K¾, Ã(e¾;k) = P(e¾;k). By UBC, for each (e¾;k;N0)-










0 if 0 2 C













¾;k)j ¡ 1 = e
¾;k(Γ);
where Γ is a minimum spanning network on N0 for mcst situation e¾;k. By
EFF, we have
P
i2N Ãi(e¾;k) = e¾;k(Γ), and then inequalities in relation (12)





0 if 0 2 Ci(e¾;k)
1





0 if 0 2 Ci(e¾;k)
1




Now we show that for any mcst situation w 2 WN0, Ã(w) = P(w). Let











Further, from (8), (13) and (14) we obtain Ã(w) = P(w).
To prove the logical independence of the four properties we need to con-
sider some other solutions on WN0:
i) ®P, an ® multiple of the solution concept P, with ® 2 [0;1);
ii) ², such that ²i(w) =
w(Γ)
jNj and i 2 N, where Γ is a minimum spanning
network on N0 for mcst situation w;
iii) P ¿ where ¿ 2 ΣN, the set of bijections on N. To introduce this so-
lution we follow the same plan used for the P-value. Analogously11
to Deﬁnition 3, for each ¾ 2 ΣEN0 we deﬁne P ¾;¿(w) = M¾;¿w¾ for
each mcst situation w in the cone K¾. Similarly to Deﬁnition 1, here
M¾;¿ek = b¾;¿;k¡1 ¡ b¾;¿;k where, for each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0j ¡ 1g and











i = 1 and b
¾;¿;jEN0j
i = 0 for each i 2 N.
A variant of Proposition 1 holds also for the maps P ¾;¿, ¾ 2 ΣEN0, and
so this enables us to deﬁne the solution P ¿(w) = P ¾;¿(w) = M¾;¿w¾
for each w 2 WN0, where ¾ 2 ΣEN0 is such that w 2 K¾. The solution
P ¿ turns out to coincide with the allocation xN introduced in Norde
et al. (2001) via an algorithmic procedure (called the Subtraction Al-
gorithm) for the computation of a population monotonic allocation
scheme (pmas) of a mcst game.
iv) D, such that (w;N0)-components “pay” proportionally to their “dis-









C2C(w) minj2Cnf0g w(fj;0g) w(Γ) if 0 = 2 Ci(w)
0 if 0 2 Ci(w);
where Γ is a minimum spanning network on N0 for mcst situation w.
Proposition 3 The axioms EFF, ET, UBC and CPL are logically indepen-
dent.
Proof The logical independence of the four properties follows from the
following table.
EFF ET UBC CPL
®P no yes yes yes
P ¿ yes no yes yes
² yes yes no yes
D yes yes yes no
In order to prove the ﬁrst row, note that by Proposition 2, also ®P satisﬁes
axioms ET, UBC and CPL but not EFF for each ® 2 I R+ such that ® < 1.12
By deﬁnition, P ¿ satisﬁes the CPL property. Similarly, via a variant of the
arguments used in Proposition 2, it is possible to prove that P ¿ satisﬁes also
EFF and UBC. In order to show that P ¿ does not satisfy the ET property,
consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2g and w as depicted













Figure 2: The mcst situation < f0;1;2g;w >.
To prove the third row, it is easy to see that ² satisﬁes EFF, ET and
CPL. To see that ² does not satisfy the UBC property, consider again the
mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2g and w as depicted in Figure
2. Then ²(w) = (3
2; 3
2), i.e. player 1 in the (w;N0)-component C = f1g pays
more than mini2Cnf0g w(fi;0g) = 1.
For the proof of the last row, note that D trivially satisﬁes EFF and ET.
Let w 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾. The UBC property





C2C(w) minj2Cnf0g w(fj;0g) ¸
¸
minj2C¤ w(fj;0g) P
C2C(w) minj2Cnf0g w(fj;0g)w(Γ) =
P
j2C¤ Dj(w):
In order to prove that D does not satisfy the CPL property, consider the
two mcst situations < N0;w0 > and < N0;w00 >, with N0 = f0;1;2g and w0,



























Figure 3: Two mcst situations in the same Kruskal cone.
Note that w0;w00 2 K¾ with ¾(1) = f0;2g, ¾(2) = f1;2g and ¾(3) = f0;1g.
Then D(w0) = (1;0) and D(w00) = (60
21; 3
21).
Diﬀerently, the sum of the two mcst situations w0 + w00 is the mcst
situation < N0;w0 + w00 > with w0 + w00 depicted in Figure 4. Finally,

















Figure 4: The mcst situation < f0;1;2g;w0 + w00 >.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper a solution for mcst situations, the P-value, has been introduced.
Also, an axiomatic characterization of the P-value using the properties EFF
(Eﬃciency), ET (Equal Treatment), UBC (Upper Bounded Contribution)
and CPL (Cone-wise Positive Linearity) is given.








where w 2 WN0 and P ¿(w) are as described in Section 4. It is shown in
Norde et al. (2001) that [P ¿
i (wjS[f0g)]S22Nnf;g;i2S is a pmas.
The P-value for mcst situations induces a cost sharing rule for mcst
games, which we call the Π-value (Potters value). The Π-value is the map
Π : MCST
N ! I RN
+ obtained by Π(cw) = P(w), where w 2 WN0. It follows
that Π is positive linear on the cone G¾, i.e. for all cw;cw0 2 G¾ and all
®;®0 2 I R+ it holds
Π(®cw + ®
0cw0) = ®Π(cw) + ®
0Π(cw0):
Moreover, (15) implies that the Π-value is a population monotonic allocation
rule. To be more concrete, let us denote by cS
w the subgame of cw with player
set S, S µ N, deﬁned by cS
w(T) = cw(T), for each T µ S. The Π-value
assigns to each cS
w 2 MCST
S the P-value of the mcst subsituation wjS0,
where S0 = S [ f0g. In formula Π(cS




w)]S22Nnf;g;i2S is a pmas.
In Tijs et al. (2003) we focus on other monotonicity properties of the
P-value like cost monotonicity and drop-out monotonicity.
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